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A Strategic Left? Starmerism, Pluralism and the
Soft Left
PAUL THOMPSON, FREDERICK HARRY PITTS AND JO INGOLD
Abstract
This article places the Labour Party’s present post-Corbyn renewal in the context of previous
periods of renewal in the party’s recent history, associating with the new leadership of Keir
Starmer a potential to rediscover the strategic project of the pluralist soft left as an alternative
to the programmatic character of the hard left. After assessing the Corbynist hegemony
established in the Labour Party between 2015 and 2019, it considers the current absence of
any clearly defined set of principles or values underpinning ‘Starmerism’. It then looks back
to the Kinnockite ascendency in the 1980s, and the Blairite ascendency in the 1990s, as possi-
ble templates for how the party reassesses its positioning with reference to changing elec-
toral, social and economic circumstances. A critique of Corbynism’s left populism culminates
in a consideration of the possible grounds for a new pluralist agenda attuned to the policy
and electoral challenges Labour faces today.
Keywords: Labour Party, British politics, the left, Keir Starmer, pluralism, populism
Introduction
AFTER A LEADERSHIP election where most can-
didates carefully crept around the legacy of
Corbynism, the first few months with Keir
Starmer at the helm have been charac-
terised by a continued absence of bigger-
picture thinking. As Starmer has settled
into the leadership, commentators from
across the spectrum have issued a series of
‘whither Starmerism’ missives, searching for
a systematic approach underpinning his
politics.1 To query the absence of a distinc-
tive ‘Starmerism’ in the wake of a bruising
defeat and the worst global crisis since the
Second World War does seem somewhat
unrealistic. Labour under Starmer has done
well to claw back quickly a massive poll
deficit in difficult circumstances. Setting out
ideological coordinates has correctly taken
a back seat to some savvy strategising
around the pandemic response. Breaking
free of burdensome ‘pledges’ and immov-
able ‘values’ creates the space to build
slowly something new. There were signs in
Starmer’s recent virtual conference speech
that a substantive vision is gradually coher-
ing.2
When Keir Starmer was elected Labour
Party leader and formed his Shadow Cabi-
net, it was widely reported as the return of
the ‘soft left’.3 Soft left is generally taken to
mean the space between Corbynite remnants
on the left, and Progress and Labour First on
the right. The soft left’s standard bearer since
2015, Open Labour, is attracting new mem-
bers and the ire of an increasingly irrelevant
hard left. Asserting itself online and in inter-
nal party elections, through Open Labour
the soft left is gaining a stronger organisa-
tional profile, underpinned by values of
openness and pluralism. But positions and
policies which go beyond appeals to party
democracy are less well defined. Recent
accusations that Starmer’s new leadership
lacks vision, meanwhile, suggest an absence
of any coherent soft left agenda at the top of
the party.4 If the new leadership represents
the return of the soft left, it has arisen largely
without ideological trace. Unlike Blairism, it
draws from no wellspring of intellectual
renewal or factional warfare waged for a
decade or more previously.
In its sudden resurfacing, the soft left in
this respect resembles Corbynism. As its con-
tradictions became clear, Corbynism
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appeared to be a ‘crest without a wave’.5 An
intellectually moribund hard left emerged
blinking from the political wilderness, its
accidental leader thrust into the limelight by
the nominations of self-described ‘morons’ in
the parliamentary Labour Party.6 The leader-
ship election in 2015 unlocked a latent yearn-
ing for political authenticity and purity,
teamed with a post-crisis populism of the
left.
Once in command of the party machine,
Corbynism did produce a new political and
media ecosystem that stimulated some pas-
sionate debate and activism on the more cre-
ative shores of Momentum. John McDonnell
led some serious and innovative policy
work, but intellectually, the usual hard left
reflexes backfilled the initial ideas deficit:
outdated anti-austerity politics, inconsistently
applied anti-imperialism, and an often con-
spiracist anti-capitalism.7 Rather than moor-
ing the project in a set of underpinning
principles, these positions actually left the
party adrift morally and electorally—namely
in its response to the anti-semitism within its
ranks and the Russian chemical attack in Sal-
isbury.8 Corbynists saw these principles as
projecting integrity, but they in fact substi-
tuted for a coherent strategy. This lack of
strategy is not something specific to the par-
ticular time and place, but foundational to
the hard left: the hard left is in essence pro-
grammatic rather than strategic. Its politics
flow from a belief in certain fundamental
truths and values which, while tweaked to
fit the times, imply a strongly maximalist
realisation of every piece of a political and
policy programme, with little consideration
of electoral or economic feasibility, or of the
need for trade-offs and compromises.
There is a massive hole where a strategic
analysis of the electorate should be, precisely
because the hard left is ideologically pre-dis-
posed to believe that it is already speaking
for the working class and sometimes more
nebulously ‘the people’.9 Rather than elec-
toral dynamics or economic conditions, the
barriers to the achievement of a maximalist
programme are seen as lack of ‘correct’ lead-
ership, activists on the ground, and the con-
nivance of the media and other shadowy
forces arraigned against the left. The compre-
hensive defeat of Corbynism in the 2019
election was a case in point. Corbynists,
including union bureaucrats, claimed to
speak for the working class even as a major-
ity of them backed the Tories.10
Where the hard left represents the ‘pro-
grammatic’ left, then, any soft left project
worth its salt must instead represent a
‘strategic’ left attuned to the shifting present.
Political strategy, in this sense, has two fun-
damental objects. The first is a continuing
ability to analyse and understand core trends
in economic social and cultural structures—
in other words, to have a handle on the
changing dynamics of capitalism itself. The
second is to understand changes in the elec-
torate—shifts in attachments, institutions
and preferences, and how they interact with
broader structural changes. In his virtual
conference speech, Starmer was right to say
that all successful Labour leaderships possess
a modernising project. The difficulty facing
Starmer is that the Labour centre-left has
spent little time in the last five years devel-
oping an intellectual agenda independent of
Corbynism. It is dangerous for Labour to
play host to two ascendancies within a dec-
ade without any roots or coordinates. In
defining his modernising project within the
space opened up by this absence, Starmer
could look back at the last time the ‘pro-
grammatic left’ was influential in Labour—
the 1980s—and the struggle of the ‘strategic
left’ to defeat it.
Pluralism in opposition
Although Neil Kinnock’s famous 1985 con-
ference speech confronting Militant is gener-
ally considered the catalyst for the defeat of
the hard left in the 1980s, the serious work
of changing hearts and minds among the
membership was actually undertaken by the
Labour Coordinating Committee (LCC).11 At
the time of the 1983 election defeat, the LCC
was the umbrella organisation for the party’s
left, but as the scale of the electorate’s rejec-
tion became clear, the LCC split. Tony Benn,
the lodestar of the hard left minority,
described the defeat as a ‘triumph for social-
ism’, denominated in the 8 million people
who voted for the party’s radical mani-
festo.12 The soft left LCC majority, mean-
while, went its own, modernising way.
While retaining many of the radical elements
on economic policy, there was an acceptance
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that the structure and culture of social class
had changed, developing new preferences
and attachments. Policies such as blanket
opposition to tenants’ right to buy their
council homes were no longer viable.
Beyond particular positions and policies,
something else was happening: the soft left
was redefining its core values. Drawing les-
sons from the limitations of top-down social-
ism in both its labourist and communist
form, the central leitmotif of the new politics
was pluralism. Powered by interventions by
the likes of Mike Rustin, Geoff Hodgson and
Peter Hain, this called for pluralism in forms
of ownership; market conditions and plan-
ning mechanisms; the social and political
actors central to political change; and the cit-
izenship rights granted employees, con-
sumers and tenants.13 A ‘mass politics’
perspective focussed on turning the party
outwards, beyond the limited activist world-
view. As the LCC argued in 1986:
We must not confuse the necessary alliances
of activists with the central task of building a
new popular majority for socialism. The two
only partially overlap. Partly because of the
unique and contrasting needs of different
groups, Labour must construct a politics and
programme that not only addresses the
needs of particular interest groups, but
appeals across social boundaries to people as
citizens as well as workers, women or con-
sumers.14
In contrast, the hard left fought to main-
tain continuity with the 1983 maximalist pro-
gramme, unconcerned that the electorate had
rejected it. Positions dominate politics, but
adherence to positions marks ideological
purity. Little or no effort was made to anal-
yse changing economic or cultural condi-
tions. The dominant view was that
Thatcherism represented business as usual
for capitalism. Emphasis fell on engineering
confrontations between the government and
the few local authorities where the hard left
held sway, like Liverpool and Lambeth. In
the face of its impossible demands and
unwinnable battles, Kinnock’s conference
speech challenging the hard left cascaded
down through the LCC’s relentless campaign
for democratic renewal, which instigated a
decisive shift among the membership,
resulting in soft left slates winning National
Executive Committee elections.15
Nevertheless, whatever advances were
being made, the soft left was not running
the party. Kinnock and his deputy Roy Hat-
tersley’s leadership was firmly centrist, and
while modernisation started apace, little pro-
gress was made in developing credible, radi-
cal policies for the new era. The leadership
floundered around, wasting considerable
time and effort developing and debating
Hattersley’s inquiry into the party’s ‘aims
and values’ and then inaugurating a well-in-
tentioned but ultimately inconclusive policy
review.16 Preoccupied with principles ulti-
mately contingent on changing social and
economic conditions, the defeat in the 1992
election indicated the limits of the existing
modernisation project and the need for strat-
egy.
Pluralism in power?
Whereas the 1980s are a distant memory to
much of the modern party membership, the
lessons learnt from the 1990s still resonate.
The lessons drawn from New Labour are not
always the right ones, however. One of the
abiding myths of the hard left is that New
Labour under Blair represented a simple and
slavish continuity with neoliberalism, but the
New Labour project is best understood in
two phases: winning and governing. The for-
mer was a brilliantly successful reimagining
of Labour as a party in touch with the mod-
ern world and its electorate, with a popular
leader and leadership team. The 1997 mani-
festo was minimalist rather than maximalist,
but component parts like devolution and the
minimum wage were radical. In the transi-
tion between winning a popular majority
and developing a strategy for governance,
Blair went through a period of experiment-
ing with the development of a radical, third
way stakeholder approach, drawing on the
intellectual energies unlocked in the revision-
ist left in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
But this transition between ‘winning’ and
‘governing’ stalled. Blair promised to both
win and govern as New Labour, without
accounting for the different strategic require-
ments attached to each. Hamstrung by tacti-
cal commitments to Tory spending plans, a
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huge opportunity was missed to develop a
more transformative agenda. Two strategic
orientations subsequently underpinned
Labour policy either side of the millennium.
The first, inherited from the pages of Marx-
ism Today and pivotal to the Blair project via
advisors like Charles Leadbeater, was an
optimistic narrative about capitalism that
projected information and knowledge as the
new sources of wealth, and high-skill cre-
ative and professional jobs as the engine of
growth in the labour market.17 The second
was a consumer-driven and market-led
approach to public sector reform, most nota-
bly expressed in the work of Anthony Gid-
dens and Julian Le Grand.18 The knowledge
economy narrative allowed the Chancellor,
Gordon Brown, to use the proceeds of eco-
nomic expansion and financial deregulation
to make a significant boost to public spend-
ing. But, with financialisation the real driver
of economic change, deregulation was a dis-
aster waiting to happen. Public sector
reform, meanwhile, had positive effects in
terms of waiting times and other outcomes,
but led to wasteful reorganisations, exclusion
of employee expertise and a proliferation of
top down targets.
The correct lesson to learn from New
Labour is what separates out the soft or
‘strategic’ left from the centre. Unlike cen-
trists in the mould of Blair and Brown, left
social democrats are intrinsically more scep-
tical about capitalism, recognising that its
inbuilt tendencies imply the unequal concen-
tration of wealth and power. This is not the
blanket anti-capitalism of the hard left, given
that capitalism can take different forms,
shaped by different strategic choices. But it
does recognise that a transformative political
agenda requires serious and systematic inter-
vention and regulation. The destruction of
Labour’s electoral advantage in the ‘red wall’
did not start with the excesses of Corbynism.
It was also rooted in the mistaken assump-
tions about the benign growth trajectories of
contemporary product and labour markets
forged in the incomplete strategic transition
from ‘winning’ to ‘governing’ under Blair. In
reality, many regions were being left behind,
with shrinking opportunities and the
replacement of secure, skilled jobs by indus-
tries with a preponderance of lower skill and
often more precarious work. While Blairism
is often characterised as overly pragmatic by
its opponents, these outcomes were the
result of active strategies that, crafted less to
govern than to win elections, optimistically
misread the direction of contemporary capi-
talism and the electorate. One consequence
was the partial erosion of Labour’s electoral
base.
Populism and its discontents
The global financial crash finally and fatally
undermined the New Labour strategy, given
that it was premised on financialised and
debt-fuelled economic expansion paying for
investment in public services and labour
market support for the low paid. Tory strat-
egy under David Cameron and George
Osborne combined liberal social policies with
aggressive austerity measures to drive down
public spending. It worked to the extent that
the majority of the electorate came to believe
that such measures were a necessary anti-
dote to rising debt, and that Labour was
responsible for there being, as Labour Trea-
sury Secretary, Liam Byrne, put it in an infa-
mous memo to his Tory successor, ‘no
money left’.19 Meanwhile, the soft left incli-
nations of Ed Miliband and his strategic
advisor, Stewart Wood, were not consoli-
dated into any distinctive strategic approach,
and the party defaulted to a dispiriting
brand of cautious retail politics that failed in
the 2015 election.
Two factors changed the political land-
scape and its strategic possibilities. The first
was the Brexit victory in the 2016 referen-
dum, setting in motion the inexorable rise of
the populist right and the recasting of elec-
toral blocs around remain and leave posi-
tions. The second was Corbyn’s victory in
Labour’s 2015 leadership contest, which cre-
ated the conditions for the emergence of an
anti-austerity left populism that, pitted
against the ineffectual, unprepared Theresa
May administration in the 2017 general elec-
tion, told the right story at the right time.
But for all the rhetoric Labour advanced, the
Tories still won. More importantly, within a
short time the battle lines were redrawn
around Brexit, and under Corbyn’s leader-
ship Labour was completely unable to fash-
ion any substantial or agile strategic
response.
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In this context, a contest of rival pop-
ulisms was only ever likely to have one win-
ner. An unpopular leader and a maximalist
programme that few trusted or found credi-
ble went up against Boris Johnson’s simple,
resonant message on Brexit, underpinned by
a strategic land grab on Labour heartlands
led by his electoral mastermind Dominic
Cummings. Still programmatically fighting
the last war against austerity and neoliberal-
ism when a newly interventionist Tory party
was changing the ground of politics, Cor-
bynism was not the substantial and signifi-
cant social and political force it had
appeared to have become, but the virtual,
disconnected movement many had suspected
it to be in the first place.20 This was not least
in the red wall seats where the election was
won and lost. Simultaneously convinced of
its capacity to speak for the working class,
rapt in pursuit of an imaginary ‘non-voter’,
and beguiled by the emergence of new pro-
gressive coalitions in its urban heartlands
and university towns, Corbynism was
wholly ill-equipped to deal with the further
erosion of this part of Labour’s traditional
support.21 Throw in the party’s decimation
in Scotland, and Starmer inherits from the
catastrophe of Corbynism an incredibly diffi-
cult political landscape around which to
develop an electorally successful political
strategy.
Signs of strategy
Today, the response to the Covid-19 pan-
demic has meant that party politics on both
sides of the aisle has reverted, at times tenta-
tively and temporarily, to technocratic type.
But even this seemingly favourable post-
populist context presents Labour with the
strategic threat of an agile and ambitious
Tory operation often let down by its lack-
adaisical leader. As indicated in Michael
Gove’s recent Ditchley speech, the Tories are
taking advantage of the pandemic to acceler-
ate their own pre-existing big-picture agenda
for reform, targeted at the voters Labour lost
at the last election.22 Taking forward the
‘levelling up’ project resulting from their
election success across the so-called red wall,
this agenda is underpinned by appeals to
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal,
and resonates with a wider shift across the
political spectrum towards a more interven-
tionist, post-austerity state. Whether under
Miliband or Corbyn, the political economy
guiding recent party policy was defined by
opposition to austerity and critiques of free-
market capitalism struck in the long after-
math of the 2008 financial crisis. While this
was necessary, Labour cannot compete in
today’s changed landscape by remaining
wholly in the same posture.
Starmer’s ‘modernisation’ speech at
Labour’s virtual party conference in Septem-
ber showed the first tentative signs of a fresh
strategic approach. This displays the influ-
ence of his new Director of Policy, Claire
Ainsley, whose book The New Working Class
combines a sociology of demographic shifts
in class relations around work and social
and economic life that makes a convincing
case for how policies should be developed
and communicated in light of these
changes.23 Ainsley’s strategic approach piv-
ots around a ‘values offer’ for the electorate
to identify with leader and party. This ‘offer’
is, in itself, based on a close reading of
changing economic and cultural conditions,
framed in terms of the rise of a new service-
based social, working class, with a mixture
of precarious and more stable jobs and
incomes. It suggests that Labour’s communi-
cation and policies should articulate and
mobilise the ‘core moral languages’ of voters,
including care, fairness, loyalty, decency and
family. Some of these themes can certainly
be seen in Starmer’s conference speech. The
leadership clearly feels that it is at the ‘val-
ues offer’ stage, without the need for
detailed policies at the moment. At this stage
of the electoral cycle and mid-pandemic, this
is the right approach.
Developing a strategic approach that is
evidence based is welcome, but this is clearly
also the beginning, not the end, of strategy.
There are a number of tensions and issues.
For example, as these values are shared
across much of the electorate, to what extent
do they capture the diverse experiences of
the new working class, the assumed poten-
tial core vote? Many members of this class
live in Labour’s urban heartlands, but also in
the smaller red wall towns, yet their experi-
ences and preferences often differ sharply on
some issues. A granular analysis should
inform the priorities and trade-offs that will
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be a necessary feature of further strategic
and policy developments and coalition
building. The success of the Biden/Harris
campaign in winning back key ‘blue wall’
states in the US may also offer clues as to
electoral coalitions, but the distinctive social
cleavages in the two countries render doubt-
ful any simple transferability.
Labour’s electoral offer in the current con-
text could be sharpened by foregrounding
the twin principles of the modern soft left
that emerged in the 1980s—egalitarianism
and pluralism. Admittedly, these terms do
not figure straightforwardly in public lan-
guage, but they can be adapted to do so in
communication and policy. Importantly, the
pluralist strand within the Labour Party has
always seen beyond the horizon of the cen-
tralised state in policy making, seeking to
wield it only to afford other forms of power
in society. There is a danger that the new
‘postliberal’ interventionism on right and left
re-concentrates power in the hands of a
more directly politicised state. This would
leave unsatisfied the desires for greater con-
trol over our lives, as expressed in a dis-
torted fashion in elements of the Brexit
campaign. Pluralism should guide policies
that signal to the public a major devolution
of economic and political power. Such devo-
lution resonates with the experiences of
many northern communities during the pan-
demic, but could be extended by situating
devolution measures within a broader fed-
eral agenda for the UK, thus addressing
some of the very tough challenges in Scot-
land. Despite the devolution agenda through
mayoral combined authorities and ‘city
deals’, the reins of Whitehall still pull hard
in the UK, with the incredibly centralised
Westminster model. The Tories are still slow
to offer full devolution powers and this lim-
its what regions and locales can do. A com-
mitment to electoral reform would also be
an important signal about a pluralist political
settlement that would appeal to a different
segment of a potential electoral coalition.
Like the Tories, Labour can look to Roo-
sevelt’s New Deal for inspiration in this. At
the same time as wielding state power in an
unprecedented fashion, the New Deal suc-
ceeded precisely by giving it away.24 By
design or by defect, Roosevelt’s reforms saw
state action enable and stimulate political
and social contestation that introduced new
dynamism to work, welfare and the econ-
omy. Jobs programmes devolved power to
groups and communities to create collec-
tively a new world of work in the shadow of
the Great Depression. Encouragement of
trades unions mobilised workers to bargain
for better pay and conditions, spurring
employers to invest in skills and technolo-
gies, in turn generating productivity gains.
The continued Conservative hammering of
trade unions means that this is completely
absent from current policy responses to the
productivity puzzle and skills gaps. A plu-
ralist agenda, meanwhile, would promise to
rebuild the world of work post-pandemic
through channels for worker representation,
workplace negotiation and sectoral bargain-
ing, establishing bottom-up means to
address economy-wide issues around skills
and productivity. Through these policies to
devolve power to workers and communities,
Labour could offer a more convincing and
genuine vision of the government’s own ‘lev-
elling up’ agenda moored in a much more
fundamental redistribution and redirection
of resources than Tory plans imply. Though
sharp struggles are likely around the mode
of exit from the EU, such an egalitarian, plu-
ralist approach to economic rebalancing
would help signal that Labour has become
the party of ‘rebuild’ rather than continuity
remain, creating potential for the construc-
tion of a post-populist electoral coalition.
To conclude, in examining some of the his-
torical and contemporary factors that have
shaped the politics of the soft left, we are
not suggesting that this article has identified
all its distinctive features or differences with
the hard left. In focussing on issues of strat-
egy and the limitations of a programmatic
approach, we have argued that an under-
standing of how to win is as important as an
understanding of what to stand for. Some of
the foundations for a strategic left may be
emerging under Starmer, informed by the
work of his policy chief, Clare Ainsley. It is
also the case that strategic calculation does
not in itself signal that the outcomes have a
distinctive soft left political character. The
parting shots of disillusioned hard leftists
currently exiting Labour speak predictably of
betrayal, petty nationalism and shifts to the
right. This speaks more to their own
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disappointment than to a fair and robust
assessment of current developments. The
issue is more about how Labour moves
beyond the necessary, but insufficient, politi-
cal framing of competence in the face of the
incompetence of Johnson and his Cabinet.
Alongside the emergent ‘values offer’ under
Starmer, the party needs to give a clearer
sense of what it wants the ‘new normal’ to
look like. This will not be a re-run of all or
even most of the pledges from the maximal-
ist programme Labour offered in the 2019
election. But it will need to demonstrate its
own distinctive radicalism, because business
as usual will not cut it.
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